As part of the reforms in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since 2015, China has focussed on preparing for combat keeping conditions of the ‘Information Age’ in mind. It is doing so by integrating its services, arms and systems into a joint, network-centric fighting force, according to an article of Indian Express.

“The PLA Western Theater Command (WTC) has played a proactive role in securing China’s southern and southwestern borders, preparing for conventional and non-conventional warfighting, and acclimatising its personnel to the rough terrains and harsh altitudes of Xinjiang and Tibet,” reads the article of Anushka Saxena, a research analyst at Takshashila Institution.

 India is one of the principal operational directions in which the WTC is mandated to act. India needs to assess the WTC’s operational structure, training mandates and warfighting priorities, especially the theatre’s “multi-domain integrated joint operations” (MDIJO) efforts.

The WTC has focussed on three key factors. These include conducting combat training and preparedness exercises, getting acquainted with WTC’s harsh terrain bordering India; and building air superiority and transportation capabilities.

The WTC invests significantly in combat training and simulation. Accounts of such exercises feature both its successes and failures. In August 2018, an anti-aircraft artillery unit of Xinjiang Military District (MD) conducted a live-fire exercise in the Tian Shan mountains to refine the troops’ integrated combat capabilities.

This was a test of the interplay between Command and Control (C2) and ground-based air defence units. The evaluation stage which assessed damage revealed that many anti-aircraft positions were in flames — indicating a failure on the surprise attack test. An assessment like this may give the Indian security apparatus clues as to the WTC’s weaknesses and what it should focus on.

Given the tough terrains and complex environments, aerial dominance is central to the theatre’s capabilities — and its biggest challenge. When pitted against India, an assessment of the ORBAT (order of battle) formulated by the Belfer Center indicates that as of 2020, the ground forces deployed on both sides are similar in numbers (over 2,05,000 troops), while Indian fighter jets outnumber Chinese — a 250 to 157 balance.

On ground-based air defence, four air defence brigades are attached each to the Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts and the WTC 76th and 77th Group Armies. At the same time, the WTC air forces have their long-range surface-to-air missile installations. The WTC is enabling PLA ground and air forces to combine air defence systems. In light of this, India is investing in its own indigenous Very Short-Range Air Defence Systems (VSHORADS) and Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) to expand Army Air Defence (AAD) capabilities.

Over the years, anti-aircraft artillery units along with ground-to-air missile units, have become the backbone of the WTC’s air defence capabilities. In May 2021, the Xinjiang MD engaged in six rounds of weapons acquisition. At the time, India and China were still recovering from the deadly Galwan Valley clashes of June 2020. The fifth and sixth rounds of acquisition focussed solely on aerial superiority, through the induction of the PHL-11 122 mm calibre self-propelled multiple rocket launcher system and the HQ-17A field air defence missile system.

The challenge of transportation is central to training in these terrains too. Given the “last-mile delivery requirements” of high-altitude zones specifically in the WTC, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are adopted for transporting food and essentials to active personnel. This is in addition to the induction of the Xi’an Y-20 “Kunpeng” heavy-transport aircraft, which can fly winter gear to border troops stationed along the LAC in seven hours.

Evidence for the use of UAVs comes from a November 2020 drill conducted by the logistics departments of the PLA army and the Tibet MD, where a drone delivery unit was required to transfer hot food, water, medicine and urgent aid to personnel located at a base in the mountains, assuming that the manned mobile ground transportation unit was ‘blocked by enemy fire’.

According to the report, the success of the drone delivery unit was determined by how decisive drone operators were in making a comprehensive judgement on terrain, wind speed, temperature and other factors to ensure the unit’s safe landing at the predetermined destination. The report promises that the PLA army logistics department is preparing to expand drone delivery to armament and ammunition supplies to active last-mile locations.

In an era where the Information Age is enabling revolution in military affairs (RMA), the PLA is adapting to new modes and methods of warfighting. Integrating these is key to the PLA’s goal of becoming a “world-class force” by 2049. Over the next few years, it is only likely that the WTC will double down on such measures, creating a joint force capable of conducting successful combat operations. India, then, must continue to observe developments in the WTC and direct its efforts towards countering them.

With Rajnath Singh’s re-appointment as India’s defence minister, one of the priorities on his military modernisation agenda would be the creation of integrated theatre commands (ITCs) in the Indian armed forces. Even though there is no intended timeline for this yet, Singh has argued that in some countries, theaterisation has taken more than two decades to materialise.

This is true in China’s case if one considers the MR model a rung in the evolutionary ladder of theaterisation in the PLA. Now, as the point person for India’s theaterisation, Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan has positioned the reform as India’s response to jointness efforts in the PLA. Given that ITCs are intended to promote a joint culture and not a service-specific culture, Chauhan has expressed the belief that the reform will catapult India into a new era of combat preparedness.

However, with the Chinese PLA many steps ahead of the Indian armed forces in this regard, a concrete delivery timeline and a larger, non-lapsable modernisation fund will be critical.