In the past weeks in their annual reports, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and Article 19, two international organisations have reaffirmed that press freedom in Bangladesh is not only dwindling but has reached a crisis stage.

The fact that Bangladesh’s total score has dropped more than eight points in the past year in the RSF index does not come as a surprise to observers of Bangladesh’s political landscape and media scene. The score was spiralling down for more than a decade. It was 57 points in 2011 and decreased to  27.64 in 2024. 

The answer to the question as to why the country is on this path is also known — the erosion of democracy. As Bangladesh transformed from an electoral democracy to competitive authoritarianism to a moderate autocracy with three consecutive fraudulent elections, it’s natural that freedoms of the press and expression would face an assault. A country which is rapidly moving away from democracy cannot have a free press; a country which does not have freedom of assembly is unlikely to be a bastion of free press. These are inextricably linked.

Bangladesh is no exception in this regard. The third wave of autocratisation since 2006 is marked by the erosion of freedom of expression; therefore, these reports are not saying something that we didn’t know, neither are these unique to Bangladesh. Those who track democratic backsliding have repeatedly informed us that civil society and the media become the initial targets of emerging autocrats.  The pattern is very clear and countries such as Russia, Turkey, and Hungary provide ample evidence in this regard.

But there are two questions which warrant our attention. How did it happen? What role did the media play in the process?

In the past, traditional autocrats tended to impose direct control over the media, impose censorship, shut the media down and arbitrarily arrested journalists and owners to silence them. But in this era of Third Wave of Autocratisation, neo-autocrats adopt more stealthy ways to keep the media under control. In Bangladesh, like many other places which have experienced democratic erosion and the rise of autocrats, several tactics are used. These include legal and extra-legal measures. As for the legal measures, laws are enacted to take punitive measures within the bounds of law.

In Bangladesh, the Digital Security Act (DSA) has been the instrument in this regard. Over a period of five years between October 2018 and September 2023, the DSA became the sword which was hanging over the heads of journalists and citizens with contrarian views. Its precursor, the  Information and Technology Act (ICT Act, 2013), especially Article 57, was the weapon with a little less lethality, but its successor, the Cyber Crimes Act (CSA) 2023 serves the same purpose. The sheer number of cases filed against journalists is testimony to the use of the DSA. In the ongoing project of the Center for Governance Studies (CGS) on tracking the DSA cases, we found that in a sample of 1534 individuals who were accused under the DSA, 451 were journalists; at least 97 journalists were arrested.

The long-lasting impact of the wanton use of the law is not captured in the numbers alone but an understanding of the culture that has permeated throughout society in general and among journalists, in particular; is a ‘culture of fear.’ In journalism this strategic silencing has been internalised as ‘self-censorship’. At the early stage of democratic erosion, there used to be extralegal measures such as ‘calls’ from ‘unknown sources’ with requests and instructions. It has now subsided significantly; the mysterious callers are aware that the media personnel now understand on their own what not to print or broadcast; they know the consequences of transgression. The consequences can include controlling the ‘means’ of the media – sources of revenue can be tightened, either by depriving government advertisements or telling the private sector companies which media they should shun, for their own sake. Were there too many instances of the latter? Perhaps not, but one or two instances were sufficient to send the message. Ostensibly, the message was loud enough to be heard by all.

In the case of Bangladesh, media freedom has been curtailed through ensuring ownership of the media, particularly electronic media. It is well known in Bangladesh that no one without a good connection with the government would get the license to operate. This was established well before the incumbent came to power in 2009, but the regime has perfected the system. Most of the electronic media owners in Bangladesh are close to the current regime. The number of owners who sought and secured the nominations of the Bangladesh Awami League is a testimony to the closeness of media owners and the ruling party. In the 2024 election boycotted by the opposition, at least 19 editors and owners contested.

This is pale compared to what the pattern of ownership tells us. Most of the media in Bangladesh is owned by companies whose owners are also engaged in other businesses. In Bangladesh, media ownership by large private companies are erroneously described as ‘corporatisation of the media’. If the media became an industry on its own and was run by companies to make profit, it would have been corporatization. But in the case of Bangladesh, the way media has become a part of larger conglomerate, it is used as a shield of other business interests. The most disturbing aspect of this ownership pattern is that the owners’ business interests are in sectors which receive largesse of the regime. This either makes the owner dependent on the government or makes the media owner a hostage to the regime. Neither is an environment for independent journalism. This situation has not emerged by default but was cultivated by the regime. This allows the regime to claim that the government does not own the media; they are independent and enjoy freedom. We have heard this argument too many times from the ministers. But private ownership by the cronies of the regime is inimical to media freedom.

If one is looking for an answer as to how the media in Bangladesh progressively went on a downward spiral in the media freedom indices, the preceding factors should provide an answer. It is imperative to be reminded that these are not unique to Bangladesh, they are a leaf out of the autocrats’ playbook. Neo-autocrats try to use this method to fool citizens and international observers.

While these show the pathway of losing media freedom, one can ask what role the media play during the making and sustaining of autocrats. In an ideal situation, the media should be acting as the guardian of democracy, pluralism and freedom of expression. But understandably, not all media play the role. As discussed, when cronies of the regime own the media, we cannot expect them to be the watchdog. The role of the media as the ‘fourth estate’ is rhetoric at its best, at its worst forgotten altogether. But in Bangladesh, as is in many places, the media have played a pivotal part in the emergence of autocrats and transformation of the system of governance into an autocracy. The most important and effective way is to create a narrative that makes autocracy normal and an everyday transgression of fundamental rights of the citizens as lawful acts of the regime. These are done in a simple manner -- presenting the version of the regime as the only version of fact.

Prioritisation of the government version can be from daily reporting to a grand narrative which provides the legitimacy to the regime. Examples of both are easily discernible in the past decade in Bangladesh. Bangladeshi media, in large measures, did not question the veracity of the police’s narrative of so-called ‘crossfire’ for a long time. The presentation of law enforcement agencies’ version as a ‘report’ of facts was not merely a matter of factual inaccuracy but also a way of justifying extrajudicial killings. In a similar vein, the abject disregard of instances of human rights violation during the anti-militancy campaign has been largely ignored by the media.

Regarding the broader ideological issue, the media subscribed to the notion of development as an alternative to democracy by highlighting the infrastructural development projects without questioning the broader impacts of the development strategy. Besides, the most telling indication of a pliant media is personalisation of institutions. Personalisation of institutions contributes to executive aggrandisement, concentration of power and lack of accountability – key elements of autocratisation.

In Bangladesh, not only has the line between state, government and party been blurred, but also the distinctions between persons and institutions are deliberately obliterated; unfortunately, many Bangladeshi media acted as a cheerleader of the process.

Prof. Dr. Ali Riaz is a political scientist with research interests in South Asian politics, democratization, violent extremism, and Bangladeshi politics. He is a Distinguished Professor of political science at Illinois State University, a Nonresident Senior Fellow of Atlantic Council, and the President of the American Institute of Bangladesh Studies (AIBS). His recent publications include Pathways for Autocratization: The Tumultuous Journey of Bangladeshi Politics (Routledge: 2024), The Charade: Bangladesh’s 2024 Election (Prothoma: 2024) and a co-authored book How Autocrats Rise: Sequences of Democratic Backsliding  (Palgrave Macmillan, published in 2024)