Maj Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu of the 6th Battalion of the Parachute Regiment was on “spearhead” duties that day. It was 5 pm on 26 February 2009 when the orders came. An emergency code had been activated, and the vanguard companies of the paratrooper’s spearhead were to mobilise. A battalion strength strike force alerts 24/7 for emergency deployments, the spearhead is central to India’s power projection. A similar emergency code was activated and rescinded the night before. But when the order came again, accompanied by “five or six” IL-76 aircrafts and AN-32s, Sandhu knew something big was happening.

Two and a half hours later, over 1,000 Indian paratroopers found themselves at the Kalaikunda Air Force Station in West Bengal. Settled for the night, Sandhu’s commanding officer gave instructions. The BDR had mutinied and were killing Bangladeshi officers and their families. The recently elected prime minister Hasina, who also held the defence portfolio, felt threatened and couldn’t count on the army’s support. “She asked India for help … and that’s why we were there”, awaiting orders and “preparing for all eventualities when we touch down in Dhaka”, remembers Sandhu. New Delhi worried about the safety of Indian diplomats in Dhaka, who could well come under fire if violence escalated.

The worst massacre of army officers in Bangladeshi history was underway. Shortly after the killings began, Hasina called her closest ally in New Delhi, top Congress leader and recently appointed finance minister Pranab Mukherjee. Upon hearing what was going on, Mukherjee promised “to be responsive”. The “SOS” from Dhaka triggered the mobilisation of paratroopers and prompted foreign secretary Shivshankar Menon to urgently engage with American, British, Japanese, and Chinese envoys to lobby support for Hasina.

Apart from Kalaikunda, paratroopers were mobilised in Jorhat and Agartala. If the order came, Indian troops would enter Bangladesh from all three sides. The aim was to secure the Zia International Airport (renamed Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport) and the Tejgaon airport. Subsequently, the paratroopers would wrest control of Ganabhaban, the prime minister’s residence, and evacuate Hasina to safety. The Brigade commander overseeing the operation began distributing “first line” ammunition meant for use during active combat. A “very unusual” act, it underscored the severity of the moment. The Bangladeshi army’s reaction was a concern. If Bangladeshi generals turned against Hasina, they would resist Indian soldiers. “If it came to that, we have a whole corps in the east” which would have sent reinforcements, says Sandhu.

India almost intervened militarily in Bangladesh on 27 February. But the orders never came. Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, India’s high commissioner to Dhaka (2007-10) who has family origins in Bangladesh and called Hasina “Aapa” (elder sister) out of respect, says that “we did put some forces on alert, and conveyed to Hasina that we’re worried about her safety”. Why? Because India “didn’t know how far this will go”.

In Dhaka, the mutineers murdered their director-general and his wife at the BDR-HQ called “Pilkhana” (stable for elephants), igniting similar attacks against officers across Bangladesh. Pressure on the army chief, Gen. Moeen Uddin Ahmed, to act against the mutineers was tremendous. But if he initiated such action, it could lead to a bloodbath and heighten instability, risking Hasina’s political and personal well-being. She could be killed by the mutineers, by angry officers, or be ousted in a coup. She had been arrested once before in 2007, and that could happen again. India couldn’t take chances, so it did what it felt was needed. It threatened Moeen against the use of force.

“I was told by those who were closer to power that Gen Moeen was asked not to use force otherwise [Indian] paratroopers will drop in Dhaka within one hour”, says Touhid Hussain, then Bangladesh’s foreign secretary. India was not bluffing. “It was all real … we would’ve intervened if required”, confirms a top Indian official who was part of foreign and security decision-making.

The final orders didn’t come because Moeen stepped back from the brink. “The Prime Minister directed that the crisis should be solved politically and it has been resolved in that manner,” announced then Brig. Gen. Mahmud Hossain, the Director of Military Intelligence. “He should’ve given orders and allowed the military to address the situation”, says Lt Gen (r) Mahfuzur Rahman who was commanding a brigade at Bandarban.

There were ripple effects of the mutiny in local BDR outfits across the country over the next two days. “It was not political, and as a military crisis situation, my understanding was that the military should have been allowed to respond within set Rules of Engagement, but that didn’t happen”, Rahman notes.

India’s intervention in 2009 would have altered the subcontinent’s history. But its non-occurrence was an equally powerful turning point. By threatening to employ the use of force to protect Hasina, India blunted the Bangladeshi army to such an extent that it freed Hasina’s hand to counter opponents with impunity. Unlike her first tenure, Hasina was now liberated from pressures emanating from a politicised military, thanks to India.

Why did New Delhi react this way? After all, intervention would have undermined Bangladesh’s sovereignty and worsened India’s reputation as a hegemon. It might have saved Hasina’s life, but risked ending her career by condemning her as an Indian “stooge”, an allegation she already struggles with. Instead, India witnessed a proactive Hasina who believed that the mutiny was meant to destabilise her government and acted as such. “She took security measures too, but realised that the mutiny has to be dealt with politically and she went and met the officers” whose families and colleagues were murdered, says Chakravarty.

Abused and heckled by officers, Hasina held her ground, heard them out, and acted against the mutineers. “It was appropriate that she did that, because it had a calming effect”, argues Hussain. The mutiny’s end – about 200 were arrested after the army entered Pilkhana with tanks under the home ministry’s “supervision” – and Moeen’s restraint cleared the field for Hasina to consolidate power. Every officer who misbehaved eventually lost his job, and the BDR was disbanded. “She handled it very boldly and bravely, a courageous woman with a lot of steel in her”, Chakravarty notes in hindsight.

But the situation came down to India considering force exposed the fragility of its near east. To understand India’s insecurities when the mutiny occurred, it is essential to focus on the turbulence in ties during the 2001-06 BNP-Jamaat government in Dhaka and the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Still reeling from the shock of 26/11, New Delhi viewed the mutiny from a Pakistan-centric lens and as a national security threat. In addition to the BDR rank and file’s grievances, Indian policymakers were worried about the mutiny’s ideological composition.

“During the BNP-Jamaat rule a lot of Jamaatis were recruited into the BDR as rank and file so they were used apparently by Pakistan”, says Chakravarty. Just as relations with Pakistan hit the lowest ebb after a surge of optimism during the composite dialogue (2004-07), New Delhi could ill afford instability or an adversarial regime in Dhaka. Even though the mutiny and its international linkages generated much rumour and insinuation, the stakes for New Delhi were too high. With Indian general elections due in May, and the Sri Lankan civil war entering its final stages, Indian policymakers could ill afford Hasina’s dislocation in Bangladesh. Menon informed the US that India was concerned that if anything happened to Hasina, the Jamaat and Harkat-ul Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) would execute attacks in India from Bangladesh.

On this count, BNP parliamentarian Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury attracted attention. A powerful shipping magnate with access to the Chittagong port, Chowdhury was Khaleda Zia’s advisor and considered an ISI agent since 1971. Just as the mutiny unfolded, the India affiliate of the US-based CNN news network alleged that Chowdhury instigated the mutiny on Pakistan’s behalf. Livid, Chowdhury threatened to sue the channel and noted that Khaleda Zia would not cooperate with Hasina. On 8 March, a week after the mutiny, he triumphantly informed Western diplomats that the AL’s mishandling of the situation created deep and wide pockets of anger against Hasina among junior and mid-ranking officers, most of who supported the BNP. Chowdhury’s role around the mutiny and the fact that CNN India blamed him even before investigations began indicate a complicated history. Despite continuing formal consultations on issues such as water sharing and economic connectivity, bilateral ties had become frosty after the BNP-Jamaat rose to power in October 2001, and Chowdhury had a role to play.

India’s national security advisor Brajesh Mishra was the first foreign dignitary to congratulate Khaleda Zia in 2001. He visited Dhaka on 26-27 October two weeks after she took office. But this time her son Tarique Rahman, who was a teenager when his father was assassinated in 1981, influenced government decisions and the party more than Khaleda Zia. According to Mathur, who developed a rapport with Tarique, “he was well-disposed towards India and didn’t let his personal biases come in the way of improved bilateral ties”. But this didn’t lead to improved relations. The two “red lines” India held with Bangladesh – cut support to northeast rebels and protect Hindu minorities – were both undermined during this period. Mishra conveyed these concerns to Dhaka. But soon after elections, members of Hindu communities in Bhola and Jessore districts came under attack by ruling party members and the Jamaat. Killed, gang raped, and their properties destroyed, local Hindus were traumatised and displaced.

Similarly, Bangladesh’s support for northeast insurgents “received vigour” during this period. It came to the fore on 1 April 2004, when ten trucks full of weapons were caught in Chittagong. The largest arms haul in Bangladeshi history, this consignment was meant for the northeast, and the operation was monitored by the ULFA-I chief Paresh Baruah from a Dhaka safe house. The weapons were trans-shipped to trucks from a larger vessel moored at St. Martin’s Island, Bangladesh’s southernmost point, and then positioned at the government-owned Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Co. Ltd.’s docks. The vessel at St. Martin’s was owned by none other than Chowdhury who, India believed, was working at Pakistan’s behest and with Tarique’s approval. “That overambitious son of Khaleda Zia took over a lot of power and began pushing arms and ammunition”, says Chakravarty. Shortly after, India provided a list of 148 camps in CHT to Dhaka in coordination with the US agencies. “They would come back to us saying no, no, we’ve checked and these camps are not there … making it a game of cat and mouse”, remembers Chakravarty.

(The article was first published in the Scroll.in. It is an excerpt from ‘India’s Near East: A New History’, by Avinash Paliwal).